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Abstract
We study competitive diffusion games on graphs introduced by Alon
et al. [1] to model the spread of influence in social networks. Extend-
ing results of Roshanbin [8] for two players, we investigate the existence
of pure Nash equilibria for at least three players on different classes of
graphs including paths, cycles, grid graphs and hypercubes; as a main
contribution, we answer an open question proving that there is no Nash
equilibrium for three players on m×n grids with min{m, n} ≥ 5. Further,
extending results of Etesami and Basar [3] for two players, we prove the
existence of pure Nash equilibria for four players on every d-dimensional
hypercube.
1 Introduction
Social networks, and the diffusion of information within them, yields an in-
teresting and well-researched field of study. Among other models, competitive
diffusion games have been introduced by Alon et al. [1] as a game-theoretic ap-
proach towards modelling the process of diffusion (or propagation) of influence
(or information in general) in social networks. Such models have applications
in “viral marketing” where several companies (or brands) compete in influenc-
ing as many customers (of products) or users (of technologies) as possible by
initially selecting only a “small” subset of target users that will “infect” a large
number of other users. Herein, the network is modelled as an undirected graph
where the vertices correspond to the users, with edges modelling influence re-
lations between them. The companies, being the players of the corresponding
∗Laurent Bulteau was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Bonn, Ger-
many. Main work done while affiliated with TU Berlin.
†Vincent Froese was supported by the DFG, project DAMM (NI 369/13).
‡Nimrod Talmon was supported by DFG Research Training Group Methods for Discrete
Structures (GRK 1408). Main work done while affiliated with TU Berlin.
1
diffusion game, choose an initial subset of target vertices which then influence
other neighboring vertices via a certain propagation process. More concretely,
a vertex adopts a company’s product at some specific time during the process
if he is influenced by (that is, connected by an edge to) another vertex that
already adopted this product. After adopting a product of one company, a
vertex will never adopt any other product in the future. However, if a vertex
gets influenced by several companies at the same time, then he will not adopt
any of them and he is removed from the game. See Section 1.3 for the formal
definitions of the game.
In their initial work, Alon et al. [1] studied how the existence of pure Nash
equilibria is influenced by the diameter of the underlying graph. Following this
line of research, Roshanbin [8] investigated the existence of Nash equilibria for
competitive diffusion games with two players on several classes of graphs such
as paths, cycles and grid graphs. Notably, she proved that on sufficiently large
grids, there always exists a Nash equilibrium for two players, further conjectur-
ing that there is no Nash equilibrium for three players on grids. We extend the
results of Roshanbin [8] for two players to three or more players on paths, cycles
and grid graphs, proving the conjectured non-existence of a pure Nash equilib-
rium for three players on grids as a main result. Etesami and Basar [3] also
followed this line of research, by inverstigating the existence of Nash equilibria
for competitive diffusion games with two players on d-dimensional hypercubes.
We extend their results by showing that there always exists a Nash equilibrium
for four players on any d-dimensional hypercube.
An overview of our results is given in Section 1.2. After introducing the pre-
liminaries in Section 1.3, we discuss our results for paths and cycles in Section 2,
followed by the proof of our main contribution regarding grids in Section 3. We
discuss hypercubes in Section 4 and finish with some statements concerning
general graphs in Section 5.
1.1 Related Work
The study of influence maximization in social networks was initiated by Kempe
et al. [6]. Several game-theoretic models have been suggested, including our
model of reference, introduced by Alon et al. [1]. Some interesting generaliza-
tions of this model are the model by Tzoumas et al. [12], who considered a more
complex underlying diffusion process, and the model studied by Etesami and
Basar [3], allowing each player to choose multiple vertices. Du¨rr and Thang [2]
and Mavronicolas et al. [7] studied so-called Voronoi games, which are closely re-
lated to our model (but not similar; there, players can share vertices). Recently,
Ito et al. [4] considered the competitive diffusion game on weighted graphs, in-
cluding negative weights. Concerning our model, Alon et al. [1] claimed the
existence of pure Nash equilibria for any number of players on graphs of diame-
ter at most two, however, Takehara et al. [11] gave a counterexample consisting
of a graph with nine vertices and diameter two with no Nash equilibrium for
two players.
Our main point of reference is the work of Roshanbin [8], who studied the
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existence (and non-existence) of pure Nash equilibria mainly for two players on
special graph classes (paths, cycles, trees, unicycles, and grids); indeed, our work
can be seen as an extension of that work to more than two players. Small [9]
already showed that there is a Nash equilibrium for any number of players on
any star or clique. Small and Mason [10] proved that there is always a pure Nash
equilibrium for two players on a tree, but not always for more than two players.
Janssen and Vautour [5] considered safe strategies on trees and spider graphs,
where a safe strategy is a strategy which maximizes the minimum payoff of a
certain player, when the minimum is taken over the possible unknown actions
of the other players.
1.2 Our Results
We begin by characterizing the existence of Nash equilibria for paths and cycles,
showing that, except for three players on paths of length at least six, a Nash
equilibrium exists for any number of players playing on any such graph (Theo-
rem 1 and 2). We then prove Conjecture 1 of Roshanbin [8], showing that there
is no Nash equilibrium for three players on Gm×n, as long as both m and n are
at least 5 (Theorem 3). Then, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria for four
players on any d-dimensional hypercube (Theorem 4). Finally, we investigate
the minimum number of vertices such that there is an arbitrary graph with no
Nash equilibrium for k players. We prove an upper bound showing that there
always exists a tree on ⌊32k⌋+2 vertices with no Nash equilibrium for k players
(Theorem 5).
1.3 Preliminaries
Notation. For i, j ∈ N with i < j, we define [i, j] := {i, . . . , j} and [i] :=
{1, . . . , i}. We consider simple, finite, undirected graphs G = (V,E) with vertex
set V and edge set E ⊆ {{u, v} | u, v ∈ V }. For two vertices u, v ∈ V , we define
the distance distG(u, v) between u and v to be the length of a shortest path
from u to v in G.
A path Pn = (V,E) on n vertices is the graph with V = [n] and E =
{{i, i + 1} | i ∈ [n − 1]}. A cycle Cn = (V,E) on n vertices is the graph
with V = [n] and E = {{i, i + 1} | i ∈ [n − 1]} ∪ {{n, 1}}. For m,n ∈ N, the
m × n grid Gm×n = (V,E) is a graph with vertices V = [m] × [n] and edges
E = {{(x, y), (x′, y′)} | |x− x′| + |y − y′| = 1}. We use the term position for a
vertex v ∈ V . Note that the distance of two positions v = (x, y), v′ = (x′, y′) ∈
V is distGm×n(v, v
′) = ‖v − v′‖1 := |x − x
′| + |y − y′|. For d ∈ N, d ≥ 1, the
d-dimensional hypercube Hd = (V,E) is defined on the vertex set V = {0, 1}
d,
that is, a vertex x = x1 . . . xd ∈ V is a binary string of length d. The set of edges
is defined as E = {{x, y} | ∆(x, y) = 1}, where ∆(x, y) := |{i ∈ [d] | xi 6= yi}| is
the Hamming distance of x and y, that is, the number of positions in which x
and y have different bits. Note that distHd(x, y) = ∆(x, y).
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Figure 1: Illustrations for Theorem 1, showing a Nash equilibrium for 6 players
on P15 (top) and a Nash equilibrium for 5 players on P14 (bottom). The boxes
show the colored regions of each player.
Diffusion Game on Graphs. A competitive diffusion game Γ = (G, k) is
defined by an undirected graph G = (V,E) and a number k of players (we
name the players Player 1, . . . , Player k), each having its distinct color in [k].
The strategy space of each player is V , such that each Player i selects a single
vertex vi ∈ V at time 0, which is then colored by her color i. If two players
choose the same vertex v, then this vertex is removed from the graph. For
Player i, we use the terms strategy and position interchangeably, to mean its
chosen vertex. A strategy profile is a tuple (v1, . . . , vk) ∈ V
k containing the
initially chosen vertex for each player. The payoff Ui(v1, . . . , vk) of Player i
is the number of vertices with color i after the following propagation process.
At time t + 1, any so far uncolored vertex that has only uncolored neighbors
and neighbors colored in i (and no neighbors with other colors j ∈ [k] \ {i})
is colored in i. Any uncolored vertex with at least two different colors among
its neighbors is removed from the graph. The process terminates when the
coloring of the vertices does not change between consecutive steps. A strategy
profile (v1, . . . , vk) is a (pure) Nash equilibrium if, for any player i ∈ [k] and any
vertex v′ ∈ V , it holds that Ui(v1, . . . , vi−1, v
′, vi+1, . . . , vk) ≤ Ui(v1, . . . , vk).
2 Paths and Cycles
In this section, we fully characterize the existence of Nash equilibria on paths
and cycles, for any number k of players.
Theorem 1. For any k ∈ N and any n ∈ N, there is a Nash equilibrium for k
players on Pn, except for k = 3 and n ≥ 6.
The general idea of the proof is to pair the players and distribute these pairs
evenly. In the rest of the section, we prove three Lemmas whose straight-forward
combination proves Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. For any even k ∈ N and any n ∈ N, there is a Nash equilibrium
for k players on Pn.
Proof. If n ≤ k, then a strategy profile where each vertex of the path is chosen
by at least one player is clearly a Nash equilibrium.
Otherwise, if n > k, then the idea is to build pairs of players, which are
then placed such that two paired players are neighbors and the distance of any
two consecutive pairs is roughly equal (specifically, differs by at most two). See
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Figure 1 for an example. Intuitively, this yields a Nash equilibrium since each
player obtains roughly the same payoff (specifically, differing by at most one),
therefore no player can improve. Since we have n vertices, we want each player’s
payoff to be at least z := ⌊nk ⌋. This leaves r := n mod k other vertices, which
we distribute between the first r players such that the payoff of any player is at
most z +1. This can be achieved as follows. Let pi ∈ [n] denote the position of
Player i, that is, the index of the chosen vertex on the path. We define
pi :=
{
z · i+min{i, r} if i is odd,
pi−1 + 1 if i is even.
Note that, by construction, it holds that p1 ∈ {z, z + 1} and pk = n − z + 1.
Moreover, for each odd indexed player i ≥ 3, we have that 2z− 1 ≤ pi− pi−1 ≤
2z + 1. We claim that ui := Ui(p1, . . . , pk) ∈ {z, z + 1} holds for each i ∈ [k].
Clearly, u1 = p1 ∈ {z, z + 1} and uk = n − pk + 1 = z. For all odd i ≥ 3, it
is not hard to see that ui = ui−1 = 1 + ⌊(pi − pi−1 − 1)/2⌋ ∈ {z, z + 1}, which
proves the claim.
To see that the strategy profile (p1, . . . , pk) is a Nash equilibrium, consider an
arbitrary player i and any other strategy p′i ∈ [n] that she picks. Clearly, we can
assume p′i 6= pj for all j 6= i since otherwise Player i’s payoff is zero. If p
′
i < p1
or p′i > pk, then Player i gets a payoff of at most z. If pj < p
′
i < pj+1 for some
even j ∈ [2, k − 2], then her payoff is at most 1 + ⌊(pj+1 − pj − 2)/2⌋ ≤ z.
We can modify the construction given in the proof of Lemma 1 to also work
for odd numbers k greater than three.
Lemma 2. For any odd k > 3 ∈ N and for any n ∈ N, there is a Nash
equilibrium for k players on Pn.
Proof. We give a strategy profile based on the construction for an even number
of players (proof of Lemma 1). The idea is to pair the players, placing the
remaining lonely player between two consecutive pairs.
This is best explained using a reduction to the even case. Specifically,
given the strategy profile (p′1, . . . , p
′
k+1) for an even number k + 1 of players
on Pn+1 as constructed in the proof of Lemma 1, we define the strategy pro-
file (p1, . . . , pk) := (p
′
1, . . . , p
′
k−2, p
′
k − 1, p
′
k+1 − 1). To see why this results in a
Nash equilibrium, let z := ⌊(n + 1)/(k + 1)⌋ and note that by construction it
holds that p1 ∈ {z, z + 1}, pk = n− z + 1, and 2z − 1 ≤ pi+1 − pi ≤ 2z + 1 for
all i ∈ [2, k − 1]. Moreover, each player receives a payoff of at least z, therefore
all players (except for Player (k − 2)) cannot improve by the same arguments
as in the proof of Lemma 1. Regarding Player (k − 2), note that her payoff is
1 + ⌊(pk−1 − pk−2 − 1)/2⌋+ ⌊(pk−2 − pk−3 − 1)/2⌋ ≥ 2z − 1.
Hence, she clearly cannot improve by choosing any position outside of [pk−3, pk−1].
Also, she cannot improve by choosing any other position in [pk−3, pk−1]. To see
this, note that her maximum payoff from any position in [pk−3, pk−1] is
1 + ⌊(pk−1 − pk−3 − 2)/2⌋ = 1 + ⌊(pk−1 − pk−2 − 1 + pk−2 − pk−3 − 1)/2⌋,
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which is equal to the above payoff since pk−1 − pk−2 and pk−2 − pk−3 cannot
both be even, by construction.
It remains to discuss the fairly simple (non)-existence of Nash equilibria for
three players. Note that Roshanbin [8] already stated without proof that there
is no Nash equilibrium for three players on G2×n and G3×n and Small and
Mason [10] showed that there is no Nash equilibrium for three players on P7.
For the sake of completeness, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For three players, there is a Nash equilibrium on Pn if and only
if n ≤ 5.
Proof. If n ≤ 3, then a strategy profile where each vertex of the path is chosen
by at least one player is clearly a Nash equilibrium. For n ∈ {4, 5}, the strategy
profile (2, 3, 4) is a Nash equilibrium.
To see that there is no Nash equilibrium for n ≥ 6, consider an arbitrary
strategy profile (p1, p2, p3). Without loss of generality, we can assume that
p1 < p2 < p3 and consider the following two cases. First, we assume that
p2 = p1 + 1 and p3 = p2 + 1. If p1 > 2, then Player 2 increases her payoff by
choosing p1 − 1. Otherwise, it holds that p3 < n − 1 and Player 2 increases
her payoff by moving to p3 + 1. Therefore, this case does not yield a Nash
equilibrium. For the remaining case, it holds that p1 < p2 − 1 or p3 > p2 + 1.
If p1 < p2 − 1, then Player 1 increases her payoff by moving to p2 − 1, while if
p3 > p2 + 1, then Player 3 increases her payoff by moving to p2 + 1. Thus, this
case does not yield a Nash equilibrium as well, and we are done.
We close this section with the following result considering cycles. Interest-
ingly, for cycles there exists a Nash equilibrium also for three players.
Theorem 2. For any k, n ∈ N, there is a Nash equilibrium for k players on Cn.
Proof. It is an easy observation that the constructions given in the proofs of
Lemma 1 and 2 also yield Nash equilibria for cycles, that is, when the two
endpoints of the path are connected by an edge. Thus, it remains to show a
Nash equilibrium for k = 3 players for any Cn. We set p1 := 1, p2 := n and
p3 :=
{
⌊n/2⌋ if n mod 4 = 1,
⌈n/2⌉ else.
It is not hard to check that (p1, p2, p3) is a Nash equilibrium.
3 Grid Graphs
In this section we consider three players on the m× n grid Gm×n and we prove
the following theorem.
Theorem 3. If m ≥ 5 and n ≥ 5, then there is no Nash equilibrium for three
players on Gm×n.
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Before proving the theorem, let us first introduce some general definitions
and observations. Throughout this section, we denote the strategy of Player i,
that is, the initially chosen vertex of Player i, by pi := (xi, yi) ∈ [m]× [n]. Note
that any strategy profile where more than one player chooses the same position
is never a Nash equilibrium since in this case each of these players gets a payoff
of zero, and can improve its payoff by choosing any free vertex (to obtain a
payoff of at least one). Therefore, we will assume without loss of generality that
p1 6= p2 6= p3. Further, note that the game is highly symmetric with respect
to the axes. Specifically, reflecting coordinates along a dimension, or rotating
the grid by 90 degrees, yields the same outcome for the game. Thus, in what
follows, we only consider possible cases up to the above symmetries.
We define ∆x := maxi,j∈[k] |xi − xj | and ∆y := maxi,j∈[k] |yi − yj | to be the
maximum coordinate-wise differences among the positions of the players. We
say that a player strictly controls the other two players, if both reside on the
same side of the player, in both dimensions.
Definition 1. Player i strictly controls the other players, if for each other
Player j with j 6= i, either
(xi < xj) ∧ (yi < yj), or
(xi < xj) ∧ (yi > yj), or
(xi > xj) ∧ (yi < yj), or
(xi > xj) ∧ (yi > yj) holds.
We now prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Letm ≥ 5 and n ≥ 5. We perform a case distinction based
on the relative positions of the three players. As a first case, we consider strategy
profiles where the players are playing “far” from each other, that is, there are
two players whose positions differ by at least four in some coordinate (formally
max{∆x,∆y} ≥ 3). For these profiles, we distinguish two subcases, namely,
whether there existss a player who strictly controls the others (Lemma 4) or
not (Lemma 5). We prove that none of these cases yields a Nash equilibrium by
showing that there always exists a player who can improve is payoff. Notably, the
improving player always moves closer to the other two players. We are left with
the case where the players are playing “close” to each other, in the sense that
their positions all lie inside a 3×3 subgrid (that is, max{∆x,∆y} ≤ 2). For these
strategy profiles, we show that there always exists a player who can improve her
payoff (Lemma 6), however the improving position depends not only on the
relative positions between the players, but also on the global positioning of this
subgrid on the overall grid. This leads to a somewhat erratic behaviour, which
we overcome by considering all possible close positions (up to symmetries) in the
proof of Lemma 6. Altogether, Lemmas 4, 5 and 6 cover all possible strategy
profiles (ruling them out as Nash equilibria), thus implying the theorem.
In order to conclude Theorem 3, it remains to prove the lemmas mentioned
in the case distinction discussed above. To this end, we start with two easy
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Figure 2: Example of a strategy profile where Player 1 (white circle) has both
other players to her top right with distance at least three (the shaded region
denotes the possible positions for Player 2 and 3). Player 1 can increase her
payoff by moving closer to the others (star).
preliminary results. First, we observe that a vertex for which there is a unique
player with the shortest distance to it is colored in that player’s color (note that
this is true in general for every graph and any number of players).
Observation 1. Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph and let (p1, . . . , pk) be
a strategy profile. Let v ∈ V be a vertex for which there exists an i ∈ [k] such
that distG(pi, v) =: δ < dist(pj , v) holds for all j ∈ [k], j 6= i, then v will be
colored in color i at time δ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the distance δ. For δ = 0, it clearly follows
from the definition of the propagation process that v = pi has color i at time 0.
For all δ > 0, it follows from the induction hypothesis that v has a neighbor u
with dist(pi, u) = δ− 1 that is colored in color i at time δ− 1. Moreover, for all
neighbors w of v it holds dist(pj , w) > δ − 1 for all j 6= i. This implies that no
neighbor of v has a different color than i at time δ − 1, and thus, v has color i
at time δ.
Based on Observation 1, we show that whenever a player has distance at
least three to the other players and both of them are positioned on the same
side of that player (with respect to both dimensions), then she can improve her
payoff by moving closer to the others (see Figure 2 for an illustration).
Proposition 1. If x1 ≤ xj , y1 ≤ yj, and ‖p1 − pj‖1 ≥ 3 holds for j ∈ {2, 3},
then Player 1 can increase her payoff by moving to (x1 + 1, y1 + 1).
Proof. Let p′1 := (x1 + 1, y1 + 1) and x ∈ [x1] × [y1]. Note that ‖p
′
1 − x‖1 =
‖p1 − x‖1 + 2 < ‖pj − x‖1 = ‖p1 − pj‖1 + ‖p1 − x‖1 ≥ ‖p1 − x‖1 + 3 holds
for j ∈ {2, 3}. Hence, from position p′1, Player 1 still has the unique shortest
distance to x. By Observation 1, x gets color 1. Moreover, for any other position
x 6∈ [x1]× [y1], there is a shortest path from p1 to x going through at least one of
the positions (x1+1, y1), (x1, y1+1), or p
′
1. Clearly, there is also a shortest path
from p′1 to x of at most the same length going through one of these positions.
Thus, if x was colored with color 1 before, then x is still colored in color 1.
To see that Player 1 strictly increases her payoff from p′1, note that ‖p
′
1 −
x‖1 = ‖p1 − x‖1 − 2 holds for all x ∈ [x1 + 1,m]× [y1 + 1, n]. Hence, Player 1
now has the unique shortest distance to all those positions where the distance
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Figure 3: A profile where Player 1 (white) has distance 6 to the vertex v (black
star) and Player 2 (gray) and Player 3 (black) have distance 5 to v. The vertex u
(white square) on the shortest path from Player 2 to v indicated by thick lines
is removed during the propagation due to the shortest path from Player 3 to u.
Player 3, however, still reaches v by a path of length 5. Thus, v is not colored
by Player 1.
from p1 was at most one larger than the shortest distance from any other player.
We claim that there exists a position v ∈ [x1 + 1,m] × [y1 + 1, n] with ‖p1 −
v‖1 − minj∈{2,3} ‖pj − v‖1 ∈ {0, 1} which is not colored in color 1 before. By
Observation 1, Player 1 then gets v when moving to p′1. To verify the claim,
assume first without loss of generality that ‖p2 − p1‖1 ≤ ‖p3 − p1‖1. Then, on
any shortest path from p2 to p1, there exists a “middle” vertex v = (vx, vy) ∈
[x1, x2]× [y1, y2] with ‖p1− v‖1−‖p2− v‖1 ∈ {0, 1} and ‖p2− v‖1 ≤ ‖p3− v‖1.
Assume towards a contradiction that v is colored in color 1. Then this implies
that on every shortest path from p2 to v a vertex has been removed during
the propagation process since otherwise either v would have been removed or
colored in color 2. But this can only happen due to the position of Player 3 since
Player 1 has a larger distance than Player 2 to all vertices in the subgrid [vx, x2]×
[vy, y2]. Hence, on every shortest path from p2 to v there exists a vertex with
the same distance to p3, which implies that p3 and p2 have the same distance
to v. It follows, that also on every shortest path from p3 to v a vertex has to
be removed during propagation because of Player 2. But this is not possible
due to the structure of a grid (Figure 3 depicts a typical situation). Since p2
and p3 have the same distance to v, it follows from p2 6= p3 that x2 6= x3
and y2 6= y3. Assume without loss of generality that x2 < x3 (and thus y2 > y3)
and consider the shortest path v, (vx, vy + 1), . . . , (vx, y2), (vx + 1, y2), . . . , p2
from v to p2. At least one of the inner vertices has to be removed during the
propagation. The vertices (vx, y2), . . . , (x2 − 1, y2) cannot be removed because
their distance to p3 is strictly larger than the distance to p2. Hence, a vertex
u = (ux, uy) ∈ {(vx, vy+1), . . . , (vx, y2− 1)} has to be removed. Assume that u
has the maximum y-coordinate among the removed vertices. It follows that there
is a shortest path from p3 to u going through (ux, uy−1) or through (ux+1, uy)
on which all inner vertices are colored in color 3. But this implies that there is
also a shortest path from p3 to v going through (ux, uy − 1) or (ux+1, uy) that
is colored with color 3. Hence, v cannot have color 1.
We go on to prove the lemmas, starting with the case that the players play
9
1 2(a) 2(b)
Figure 4: Possible cases (up to symmetry) for Player 1 (white) strictly control-
ling Player 2 (gray) and Player 3 (black). Circles denote the player’s strate-
gies. The shaded region contains the possible positions of both Player 2 and 3,
whereas the black regions denote possible positions for Player 3 only. A star
marks the position improving the payoff of the respective player.
far from each other. The following lemma handles the first subcase, that is,
where one of the players strictly controls the others.
Lemma 4. A strategy profile with max{∆x,∆y} ≥ 3 where one of the players
strictly controls the others is not a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We assume without loss of generality that Player 1 strictly controls
Player 2 and Player 3, specifically, we assume that x1 < x2 and y1 < y2 and
x1 < x3 and y1 < y3 holds. Figure 4 depicts the three possible cases for the
positions of Player 2 and Player 3. For each case, we show that a player which
can improve her payoff exists.
Case 1: We assume that (x2, y2) 6= (x1+1, y1+1) and (x3, y3) 6= (x1+1, y1+1).
By Proposition 1, Player 1 gets a higher payoff from (x1 + 1, y1 + 1).
Case 2: We assume without loss of generality that (x2, y2) = (x1 + 1, y1 + 1).
(a) We assume x2 < x3 and y2 < y3. Then, x3 > x2+1 or y3 > y2+1
holds since max{∆x,∆y} ≥ 3. Note that Player 3 strictly controls
Player 1 and Player 2 and that this case is symmetric to Case 1.
(b) We assume x2 ≥ x3 or y2 ≥ y3. Then, it holds that x3 = x2
or y3 = y2. We assume x3 = x2 (the argument for y3 = y2 being
analogous). Since max{∆x,∆y} ≥ 3, we have y3 > y2 + 1, thus
Player 3 can improve by moving to (x2, y2 + 1) because then all
positions in [m]× [y2+1, n] are colored in color 3, and before only
a strict subset of these positions were colored in her color.
The other subcase, where no player strictly controls the others, is handled
by the following lemma.
Lemma 5. A strategy profile with max{∆x,∆y} ≥ 3 where no player strictly
controls the others is not a Nash equilibrium.
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1 2(a) 2(b) 2(c)
Figure 5: Possible cases (up to symmetry) when no player strictly controls the
others. Circles denote the positions of Player 1 (white) and Player 2 (gray).
The black regions contain the possible positions for Player 3. A star marks the
position improving the payoff of the respective player.
Proof. If no player strictly controls the others, then it follows that at least two
players have the same coordinate in at least one dimension. We perform a case
distinction on the cases as depicted in Figure 5.
Case 1: All three players have the same coordinate in one dimension. We as-
sume that x1 = x2 = x3 (the case y1 = y2 = y3 is analogous). Without
loss of generality also y1 < y2 < y3 holds. Since max{∆x,∆y} ≥ 3,
it follows that yi+1 − yi ≥ 2 holds for some i ∈ {1, 2}, say for i = 2.
Clearly, Player 3 can improve her payoff by choosing (x3, y2+1) (anal-
ogous to Case 2b in the proof of Lemma 4).
Case 2: There is a dimension where two players have the same coordinate but
not all three players have the same coordinate in any dimension. We
assume x1 = x2 < x3 and y1 < y2 (all other cases are analogous).
We also assume that y1 ≤ y3 ≤ y2, since otherwise Player 3 strictly
controls the others, and this case is handled by Lemma 4.
(a) We assume that y2 = y1 + 1. Then x3 ≥ x1 + 3 holds since
max{∆x,∆y} ≥ 3. Player 3 increases her payoff by moving to
(x1 + 2, y1) (analogous to Case 2b in the proof of Lemma 4).
(b) We assume that y2 = y1 + 2. Then x3 ≥ x1 + 3 holds since
max{∆x,∆y} ≥ 3. Player 3 increases her payoff by moving to
(x1 + 2, y1 + 1) (analogous to Case 2b in the proof of Lemma 4).
(c) We assume that y2 > y1 + 2 and |y2 − y3| ≤ |y1 − y3|. That is,
without loss of generality, Player 3 is closer to Player 2. Then,
by Proposition 1, Player 1 increases her payoff by moving to (x1+
1, y1 + 1).
It remains to consider the cases where the players play close to each other.
Lemma 6. A strategy profile with max{∆x,∆y} ≤ 2 is not a Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 6: Possible positions (up to symmetry) of three players playing inside a
subgrid of size at most 3× 3. The position of Player 1 (white) is denoted (x, y).
Proof. First, we assume that ∆x+∆y ≥ 2, as otherwise there would be at least
two players on the same position (so each one of them can improve by moving
to any free vertex). Without loss of generality, we also assume that ∆x ≤ ∆y,
leaving the following cases to consider (depicted in Figure 6).
Case 1: Let (x1, y1) = (x, y) ∈ [m]× [n−2], (x2, y2) = (x, y+1), and (x3, y3) =
(x, y + 2) be the positions of the three players. Clearly, with these
positions, Player 1 gets a payoff of my, Player 2’s payoff is m, and
Player 3 gets a payoff of m(n−y−1). Now, if y ≥ 3, then Player 2 can
improve by choosing (x, y−1) thus achieving a payoff ofm(y−1) > m.
If y = 1, then Player 2 improves by playing on (x, y+3) with a payoff
of m(n− y− 2) > m (remember that n ≥ 5). Also, if y = 2 and n > 5,
then Player 2 gets a higher payoff by choosing (x, y + 3). For y = 2
and n = 5, we observe that either x ≥ ⌈m/2⌉ or m − x ≥ ⌈m/2⌉
and assume, without loss of generality, that x ≥ ⌈m/2⌉ holds. Then,
applying Observation 1, it holds that, if Player 2 chooses (x − 1, y),
then all positions in [x− 1]× [y + 1] are colored in color 2, Thus, the
payoff of Player 2 is at least (⌈m/2⌉−1)3 > m (remember thatm ≥ 5).
Case 2: Let (x1, y1) = (x, y) ∈ [m − 1] × [n − 1], (x2, y2) = (x, y + 1), and
(x3, y3) = (x + 1, y) be the positions of the three players. Note that,
due to symmetry, this is the only case we have to consider (without
loss of generality). Clearly, exactly the positions in [x]× [y] are colored
in color 1, therefore Player 1 has a payoff of xy. If x < m/2, then
position (x + 2, y) yields a payoff of (m − x − 1)n ≥ (⌈m/2⌉ − 1)n
for Player 1 since she colors all vertices in [x + 2,m] × [n]. Note
that ⌈m/2⌉ − 1 ≥ x and n > y, thus Player 1’s payoff improved.
Analogously, for y < n/2, Player 1’s payoff from position (x, y + 2)
is at least m(⌈n/2⌉ − 1) > xy. If x > ⌈m/2⌉, then Player 3 can
improve by choosing (x− 1, y). To see that this is true, note first that
by choosing (x3, y3), Player 3 colors only positions in [x+ 1,m]× [n].
Now, observe that if position (x′, y′) is colored in color 3 when Player 3
chooses (x3, y3), then it holds also that position (x − (x
′ − x), y) is
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colored in color 3 when Player 3 chooses (x− 1, y) = (x− (x3 − x), y),
due the symmetries, and since the distances from this position to the
players positions are all identical. Hence, Player 3 colors at least the
same number of positions in [x− (m− x), x− 1]× [y]. Note that x−
(m−x) ≥ 2 since x > ⌈m/2⌉. By Observation 1, Player 3 additionally
colors position (1, 1) yielding a strictly greater payoff. By analogous
arguments, for y > ⌈n/2⌉, the position (x, y− 1) yields a better payoff
for Player 2. Finally, assume x = ⌈m/2⌉ and y = ⌈n/2⌉. Now, Player 1
can improve by choosing (x−1, y+1), thus coloring at least all positions
in [x−1]×[n], giving a payoff of at least (⌈m/2⌉−1)n > ⌈m/2⌉·⌈n/2⌉ =
xy for m ≥ 5 and n ≥ 5.
Case 3: Let (x1, y1) = (x, y) ∈ [m − 1] × [n − 2], (x2, y2) = (x, y + 2), and
(x3, y3) = (x + 1, y) be the positions of the three players. First, note
that Player 1 colors all positions in [x] × [y], gaining a payoff of xy,
Player 2 colors [m]× [y + 2, n], gaining a payoff of m(n− y − 1), and
Player 3 gets all positions in [x + 1, n] × [y + 1], gaining a payoff of
exactly (m− x)(y +1). Now, if y = 1, then Player 1 can choose (x, 4)
to obtain a payoff of m(n − 3) > x, since m > x and n − 3 ≥ 2.
Hence, assume y > 1, and observe that both the payoff of Player 1
from (x + 1, y − 1) and the payoff of Player 3 from (x, y − 1) equals
m(y − 1). Assuming that we have a Nash equilibrium, we obtain
the two inequations xy ≥ m(y − 1) and (m − x)(y + 1) ≥ m(y − 1),
which yield m(y − 1)/y ≤ x ≤ 2m/(y + 1). Note that we obtain a
contradiction for y ≥ 3. Hence, we can assume that y = 2 and ⌈m/2⌉ ≤
x ≤ ⌊2m/3⌋. If n ≥ 6, then Player 1 can improve by choosing (x, 5)
achieving a payoff ofm(n−4) ≥ 2m > 2x. Thus, we also assume n = 5.
Now, Player 1 can choose position (x − 1, 4) to color all but three
positions in [x− 1]× [5]. The only positions which she does not color
are (x− 1, 2), (x− 1, 1) and (x− 2, 1). Her payoff is thus 5(x− 1)− 3,
which, for all x ≥ ⌈m/2⌉ ≥ 3, is more than 2x.
Case 4: Let (x1, y1) = (x, y) ∈ [m − 1] × [n − 2], (x2, y2) = (x, y + 2), and
(x3, y3) = (x+1, y+1) be the positions of the three players. It is easy
to see that, if x = m − 1, then Player 3’s payoff is exactly one, and
she can gain more by choosing (x − 1, y + 1) instead. For x < m− 1,
note that, apart from (x3, y3), Player 3 colors only positions (x
′, y′)
with x′ ≥ x3 +1 = x+2. Note also that Player 3 does not color all of
these positions. For example, at least one of the positions (x+2, y−1)
or (x + 2, y + 3) exists on the grid (since n ≥ 5) and is reached by
Player 1 or Player 2 at the same time during the propagation process
of the game. However, by choosing (x+ 2, y + 1), Player 3 still colors
the position (x3, y3) and clearly all positions (x
′, y′) with x′ ≥ x + 2,
thus improving her payoff.
Case 5: Let (x1, y1) = (x, y) ∈ [m− 1]× [n− 2], (x2, y2) = (x+ 1, y + 2), and
(x3, y3) = (x+1, y+1) be the positions of the three players. If y = n−2,
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then Player 2’s payoff is exactly m. Therefore, she increases her payoff
by moving to (y− 1, x), because then her payoff is at least 2m. Thus,
we can assume that y < n− 2. If x ≥ m− 2, then Player 3’s payoff is
either 1 or 3 (it is 1 if x = m− 1 and 3 if x = m− 2). Therefore, she
increases her payoff by moving to (x − 2, y), because then her payoff
is at least n (and n ≥ 5). Thus, we can assume that x < m− 2. We
are left only with the case where y < n − 2 and x < m − 2. In this
case, Player 3 increases her payoff by moving to (x+ 2, y + 2).
Case 6: Let (x1, y1) = (x, y) ∈ [m − 2] × [n − 2], (x2, y2) = (x, y + 2), and
(x3, y3) = (x + 2, y) be the positions of the three players. It is clear
that only a strict subset of the positions in [x+2,m]×[n] are colored in
color 3 (for example, the position (x+2, y+2) is not colored in color 3).
By choosing (x+2, y+1), however, all positions in [x+2,m]× [n] are
colored in color 3, resulting in a strictly higher payoff for Player 3.
Case 7: Let (x1, y1) = (x, y) ∈ [m − 2] × [n − 2], (x2, y2) = (x + 1, y + 2),
and (x3, y3) = (x + 2, y + 1) be the positions of the three players.
By Proposition 1, Player 1 increases her payoff by moving to (x1 +
1, y1 + 1).
Case 8: Let (x1, y1) = (x, y) ∈ [m − 2] × [n − 2], (x2, y2) = (x + 1, y + 2),
and (x3, y3) = (x + 2, y + 2) be the positions of the three players.
By Proposition 1, Player 1 increases her payoff by moving to (x1 +
1, y1 + 1).
Case 9: Let (x1, y1) = (x, y) ∈ [m − 2] × [n − 2], (x2, y2) = (x + 1, y + 1),
and (x3, y3) = (x + 2, y + 2) be the positions of the three players.
Notice that the payoff of Player 2 is only one. It is clear that Player 2
increases her payoff more by moving to (x, y + 1), because then her
payoff is at least two, as she also colors the position (x, y + 2).
Case 10: Let (x1, y1) = (x, y) ∈ [m − 2] × [n − 2], (x2, y2) = (x, y + 2), and
(x3, y3) = (x+2, y+1) be the positions of the three players. Note first
that Player 1’s colors exactly the positions in [x + 1] × [y], thus, her
payoff is (x+ 1)y. For y = 1, Player 1 can move to (x, 4), achieving a
payoff of at least (x+1)(n−3) ≥ 2(x+1) since she colors all positions
in [x + 1] × [4, n]. Otherwise, if y ≥ 2, then, by choosing (x + 1, y),
Player 1 still colors all positions in [x+ 1]× [y], and additionally also
the position (x+ 2, y − 1).
4 Hypercubes
Etesami and Basar [3] studied diffusion games on hypercubes and proved the ex-
istence of a Nash equilibrium for two players on every d-dimensional hypercube.
In this section, we extend their result to four players.
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Recall that the vertices of Hd are all binary strings of length d, where two
vertices are adjacent if and only if they differ in exactly one bit. Moreover,
the geodesic distance of two vertices u and v is exactly the Hamming dis-
tance ∆(u, v). By a, we denote the complement of a = a1 . . . ad, where ai :=
1− ai for all i ∈ [d].
We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let x, y ∈ {0, 1}d be two adjacent vertices of Hd for d ≥ 1.
Then, every strategy profile (p1, . . . , p4) with {p1, . . . , p4} = {x, x, y, y} is a Nash
equilibrium.
A first step to prove Theorem 4 is to show that for a strategy profile of the
form as described in Theorem 4, it holds that whenever a single player chooses
another position, then for the resulting strategy profile the payoff of each player
equals exactly the number of vertices to which she has a unique closest distance.
Note that we already know from Observation 1 that each player always colors
all the vertices to which she has the uniquely closest distance. In Lemma 7 we
will show the opposite direction, namely that no player obtains vertices to which
the distance is not the unique closest distance among all players (note that this
does not hold in general). In a second step, we can then compute the payoffs
of all players and show that they are maximal for the strategy profile stated in
Theorem 4.
We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Let x, y ∈ {0, 1}d be two adjacent vertices in Hd, d ≥ 1, and let
(p1, . . . , p4) be a strategy profile with {x, y, y} ⊆ {p1, . . . , p4} and pi 6= pj for
all i, j ∈ [4], i 6= j. Let v ∈ {0, 1}d be a vertex and let δ := mini=1,...,4∆(pi, v).
If there exist i, j ∈ [4], i 6= j, such that ∆(pi, v) = ∆(pj , v) = δ, then the vertex v
will not be colored by any player at the end of the propagation process.
Proof. Since the order of the players does not matter, we assume that p1 =
p ∈ {0, 1}d, p2 = x, p3 = y, and p4 = y. For the case δ ≤ 1, the statement
clearly holds by definition of the propagation process. Hence, we consider δ ≥
2. Note that for any two vertices pi 6= pj with ∆(pi, v) = ∆(pj , v) = δ, the
distance ∆(pi, pj) must be even (and thus, at least two) since two vertices with
an odd distance cannot have the same distance to any other vertex. Hence,
x and y can never have the same distance δ to v since their distance is one
(they are adjacent). It follows that either two or three players have the same
shortest distance δ to v among all players. For both cases, we show that there
always exist two neighbors of v each having a different player with a unique
closest distance of δ− 1. Using Observation 1, we can then conclude that these
neighbors are colored in different colors and that v is thus removed.
First, assume that exactly the two players i and j have distance δ to v,
while the other two players have a distance larger than δ. Then, pi and pj differ
in ∆(pi, pj) = 2c bits for some c ≥ 1. Note that v equals pi in exactly c of
these bits and equals pj in the other c bits (otherwise they cannot have the
same distance to v). Hence, by swapping one of the c bits where v equals pj ,
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we reach a neighbor u of v such that ∆(pi, u) = δ − 1 < ∆(pj , u) = δ + 1.
Analogously, swapping one of the c bits where v equals pi yields a neighbour w
with ∆(pj , w) = δ− 1 < ∆(pi, w) = δ+1. Note that the other two players have
distance at least δ to both u and w since their distance to v is at least δ + 1.
Thus, pi has the unique shortest distance to u, and pj has the unique shortest
distance to w. According to Observation 1, u and w are thus colored in different
colors at time δ − 1. Consequently, v is removed at time δ.
Now, assume that exactly three players have the minimum distance δ to v.
Since x and y are adjacent, we know that the only two possible cases are that p,
y, and either x or y have distance δ to v.
Case 1: ∆(p, v) = ∆(x, v) = ∆(y, v) = δ < ∆(y, v). Note that ∆(y, v) =
d − ∆(y, v), which yields δ < d/2. Note further that x and y differ
in an even number of ∆(x, y) = d − 1 bits, which means d is odd.
Hence, δ ≤ (d − 1)/2. Moreover, v equals each of x and y in exactly
half of their d − 1 differing bits (otherwise v cannot have the same
distance to both). It follows that δ = (d − 1)/2 and it also holds
that xi = yi 6= vi is not possible for any i ∈ [d] (this holds since
xi = y implied y = vi, which holds since δ = (d−1)/2) . Now consider
the vertex p which also differs in δ bits to v. Clearly, p and v can
neither differ in the same δ bits as v and x, nor in the same δ bits
as v and y since then p1 would be equal to either x or y. Hence, there
exist indices i and j among the d − 1 differing bits of x and y such
that vi = yi = pi 6= xi and vj = xj = pj 6= yj . Thus, by swapping
the ith bit of v, we reach a neighbor u with ∆(x, u) = δ−1 < ∆(p, u) =
∆(y, u) = δ+1. Similarly, swapping the jth bit of v yields a neighbor w
with ∆(y, w) = δ − 1 < ∆(p, w) = ∆(x,w) = δ + 1. Clearly, also y
has distance at least δ to both u and w. Hence, by Observation 1, u
and w are colored in different colors and thus v is removed.
Case 2: ∆(p, v) = ∆(y, v) = ∆(y, v) = δ < ∆(x, v). Note that ∆(y, y) = d
is even and that v equals both y and y in exactly δ = d/2 bits. As
in Case 1, the vertex p cannot differ from v in the same δ bits as y
or y. Thus, we again find indices i and j with vi = yi = pi 6= yi
and vj = yj = pj 6= yj such that for the corresponding neighbors u
and w of v we have ∆(y, u) = δ − 1 < ∆(p, u) = ∆(y, u) = δ + 1 and
∆(y, w) = δ − 1 < ∆(p, w) = ∆(y, w) = δ + 1. Since by assumption
also x has distance at least δ from u and w, it follows that u and w
are colored in different colors and v is removed.
Lemma 7 (together with Observation 1) shows that in every strategy profile as
described in Theorem 4 the payoff of each player equals the number of vertices
to which she has the unique minimum distance among all players.
The following lemma gives upper bounds on the possible payoffs for players
in such a profile.
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Lemma 8. Let x, y ∈ {0, 1}d, d ≥ 1, and let V yyx := {v ∈ {0, 1}
d | ∆(v, x) <
min{∆(v, y),∆(v, y)}. Then, |V yyx | ≤ 2
d−2. Moreoever, if d is odd, then the
bound is even smaller, that is,
|V yyx | ≤ 2
d−2 −
1
2
(
d− 1
(d− 1)/2
)
.
Proof. Let α := ∆(x, y); thus, ∆(x, y) = d−α. For any vertex v ∈ V yyx , it holds
∆(x, v) < ∆(y, v) and also ∆(x, v) < ∆(y, v). The first inequality implies that v
equals x in more than half of the α bits where x and y differ. Analogously, the
second inequality implies that v equals x in more than half of the d − α bits
where x and y differ. Clearly, the set of bits where x and y differ is disjoint
from the set of bits where x and y differ. Hence, the number of possible vertices
in V yyx is
|V yyx | =

 α∑
ℓ=⌈(α+1)/2⌉
(
α
ℓ
) ·

 d−α∑
ℓ=⌈(d−α+1)/2⌉
(
d− α
ℓ
) (1)
≤ 2α−1 · 2d−α−1 = 2d−2,
which proves the general bound. Now, for d being odd, note that either α
or d − α is even. We assume without loss of generality that α ≤ d − 1 is even
(that is, d− α is odd). Then, Equation (1) can be written as
|V yyx | =

 α∑
ℓ=α/2+1
(
α
ℓ
) ·

 d−α∑
ℓ=⌈(d−α)/2⌉
(
d− α
ℓ
)
≤
(
2α−1 −
1
2
(
α
α/2
))
· 2d−α−1
= 2d−2 −
(
2d−α−2 ·
(
α
α/2
))
.
We now use the following identity for the central binomial coefficient(
α
α/2
)
=
α!
((α/2)!)2
= 2α ·
1 · 3 · . . . · (α− 1)
2 · 4 · . . . · α
to obtain
|V yyx | ≤ 2
d−2 −
(
2d−2 ·
1 · 3 · . . . · (α− 1)
2 · 4 · . . . · α
)
≤ 2d−2 −
(
2d−2 ·
1 · 3 · . . . · (d− 2)
2 · 4 · . . . · (d− 1)
)
≤ 2d−2 −
1
2
(
d− 1
(d− 1)/2
)
.
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We can now proceed with proving Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. To start with, observe that for d = 1 the statement clearly
holds since there are only two vertices in H1, which gives a payoff of zero for
each player, and it is not possible to obtain more than zero vertices for any
player (by definition of the diffusion game).
In the following we consider d ≥ 2. Since the ordering of the players does not
matter, we fix the strategy profile (p1 = x, p2 = x, p3 = y, p4 = y). Moreover,
due to the symmetry of the hypercube, we only have to consider the case that
Player 1 changes her strategy. Let us first determine the payoff of Player 1
for the above profile. According to Observation 1 and Lemma 7, we know that
Player 1 obtains exactly those vertices v ∈ {0, 1}d to which she has the unique
minimum distance, that is, ∆(x, v) < min{∆(x, v),∆(y, v),∆(y, v)}. Recall
that x and y are adjacent, that is, they differ in ∆(x, y) = 1 bit. Therefore,
∆(x, v) < ∆(y, v) implies that v equals x in that bit. Thus, we have ∆(y, v) =
∆(x, v) + 1, ∆(x, v) = d − ∆(x, v), and ∆(y, v) = d − 1 − ∆(x, v). Hence, v
has to satisfy ∆(x, v) < (d − 1)/2 in order to satisfy ∆(x, v) < ∆(y, v) and
∆(x, v) < ∆(x, v). That is, v is allowed to differ from x in at most ⌊(d− 1)/2⌋
of the d− 1 bits where x is equal to y. The payoff of Player 1 is thus
⌊(d−1)/2⌋∑
ℓ=0
(
d− 1
ℓ
)
.
Note that this payoff equals 2d−2 if d is even, and 2d−2− 12
(
d−1
(d−1)/2
)
if d is odd.
Now, let Player 1 choose an arbitrary vertex p1 ∈ {0, 1}
d. Clearly, we
can assume that p1 6∈ {x, y, y} since her payoff is zero otherwise. Hence, by
Observation 1 and Lemma 7, we know again that the payoff of Player 1 equals
the number of vertices in {v ∈ {0, 1}d | ∆(x, v) < min{∆(x, v),∆(y, v),∆(y, v)}}.
By Lemma 8, we know that this number is at most 2d−2 if d is even, and at most
2d−2 − 12
(
d−1
(d−1)/2
)
if d is odd. Therefore, Player 1 cannot increase her payoff by
changing her strategy, which finishes the proof.
The existence of Nash equilibria on hypercubes for three players as well as
for more than four players remains open in general.
5 General Graphs
Figure 7: A graph on 8 vertices with no Nash equilibrium for two players.
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u1 u2 u3
v1,1 v1,2 v1,3
v2,1 v2,2 v2,3
v3,1 v3,2 v3,3
v4,1 v4,2 v4,3
Figure 8: A tree with no Nash equilibrium for 9 players.
In this section, we study the existence of Nash equilibria on arbitrary graphs.
Using computer simulations, we found that for two players, a Nash equilibrium
exists on any graph with at most n = 7 vertices. For n = 8, we obtained
the graph depicted in Figure 7, for which there is no Nash equilibrium for two
players. As it is clear that adding isolated vertices to the graph in Figure 7 does
not allow for a Nash equilibrium, we conclude the following.
Corollary 1. For two players, there is a Nash equilibrium on each n-vertex
graph if and only if n ≤ 7.
For more than two players, we can show the following.
Theorem 5. For any k > 2 and any n ≥ ⌊ 32k⌋ + 2, there exists a tree with n
vertices such that there is no Nash equilibrium for k players.
Proof. We describe a construction only for n = ⌊ 32k⌋ + 2, as we can add arbi-
trarily many isolated vertices without introducing a Nash equilibrium.
We first describe the construction for k being odd. We create one P3, whose
vertices we denote by u1, u2, and u3, such that u2 is the middle vertex of this P3.
For each i ∈ [2, ⌈k2⌉], we create a copy of P3, denoted by Pi, whose vertices we
denote by vi,1, vi,2, and vi,3, such that vi,2 is the middle vertex of Pi. For each
i ∈ [2, ⌈k2 ⌉], we connect vi,1 to u3. An example for k = 9 is depicted in Figure 8.
To see that there is no Nash equilibrium for the constructed graph, consider
first strategy profiles for which u3 is free (that is, no player chooses u3). If also
both u1 and u2 are free, then there exists some Pi with at least 2 occupied
vertices (by the pigeon-hole principle). It is clear that at least one of the players
occupying these vertices can increase her payoff by moving to u3. If u1 and u2
are both occupied, then there exists some Pi with at most 1 occupied vertex
(again, by the pigeon-hole principle). It is clear that the player occupying this
vertex can increase her payoff by moving to u3. If only one vertex out of u1
and u2 is occupied, then the player occupying this vertex can increase her payoff
by moving to u3. Therefore, we can assume that u3 is occupied. In this case, it
holds that if both u1 and u2 are free, then at least one player has a payoff of 1,
and she gains more by moving to u2. If both u1 and u2 are occupied, then at
least one Pi has at most one occupied vertex, and this occupied vertex can only
be vi,1, therefore the player occupying u2 gains more by moving to vi,2. Lastly,
if exactly one out of u1 and u2 is free, then at least one Pi1 has at most one
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occupied vertex, and this occupied vertex can only be vi1,1. Moreover, at least
one Pi2 has at least two occupied vertices, therefore a player occupying one of
these vertices gains more by moving to vi1,2. Therefore, this graph has no Nash
equilibrium for k players.
For k being even, we create one P2, whose vertices we denote by u1, u2. For
each i ∈ [2, k2 + 1], we create a copy of P3, denoted by Pi, whose vertices we
denote by vi,1, vi,2, and vi,3, such that vi,2 is the middle vertex of Pi. For each
i ∈ [2, k2 + 1], we connect vi,1 to u2. This graph has no Nash equilibrium for k
players, as can be verified by a similar analysis as above.
6 Conclusion
We studied a competitive diffusion game for three or more players on several
classes of graphs, answering—as a main contribution—an open question con-
cerning the existence of a Nash equilibrium for three players on grids [8] neg-
atively. Further, extending previous results on hypercubes [3], we proved that
Nash equilibria always exist for four player on d-dimensional hypercubes. With
this work, we provide a first systematic study of this game for more than two
players. However, there are several questions left open, of which we mention
some here.
An immediate question (generalizing Theorem 3) is whether a Nash equilib-
rium exists for more than three players on a grid. Computer simulations lead us
to the conjecture that there is no Nash equilibrium for four players on a grid of
size larger than 6× 6. A further immediate question (generalizing Theorem 4)
is whether a Nash equilibrium exists for three players or more than four players
on a d-dimensional hypercube. Also, giving a lower bound for the number of
vertices n such that there is a graph with n vertices with no Nash equilibrium
for k players is an interesting question as it is not clear that the upper bounds
given in Theorem 5 are optimal. In other words, is it true that n ≤ 32k + 1
implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium for k players?
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